A place to share my thoughts and reflections

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  • TLTB Statement:

    CLARIFICATION ON LAND OWNERSHIP AND MINERAL RIGHTS IN FIJI

    TLTB notes that many views and comments have been shared on social media platforms regarding land and land ownership in Fiji. TLTB intends to demystify land ownership in Fiji to clear up misconceptions, particularly regarding the rights of iTaukei landowners.

    The starting point of the discussion must be on the different land tenure types in Fiji, of which there are three: iTaukei land, Freehold land and State land

    iTAUKEI LAND

    The iTaukei Lands Act 1905 defines “iTaukei land” as land which is neither State Land nor subject of a State grant nor iTaukei grant, but includes:

    (a) All vacant land, including such land declared as vacant land under section 19 of the iTaukei Lands Act 1905

    (b) All land set aside by proclamation under section 18 of the iTaukei Land Trust Act 1940

    (c) All extinct mataqali land vested in the Board under section 19 of the iTaukei Land Trust Act 1940

    iTaukei Land is owned by the respective iTaukei owners and administered by TLTB for the benefit of the iTaukei owners under the iTaukei Land Trust Act 1940. About 91% of Fiji’s landmass is iTaukei land.

    FREEHOLD LAND

    Freehold lands in Fiji are Crown grants and represent absolute ownership of land in perpetuity (estate in fee simple). Lands which were sold prior to Fiji’s cession to Great Britain in 1874 required validation by the Lands Claims Commission in 1876. All validated sales were issued with a Crown Grant. A total of 1582 Crown Grants covering an area of 152,815 hectares thus became “freehold land”. Some Grown Grants have since been purchased or acquired by the State. These lands are now known as “State Freehold Lands”.

    About 6% of Fiji’s landmass is freehold land.

    STATE LAND

    Under section 2 of the State Lands Act 1945 “State lands” means all public lands in Fiji including foreshores and the soil under the waters of Fiji (including all inland waters such as

    rivers and streams) which are for the time being subject to the control of the state and all lands which have been or may be hereafter acquired by or on behalf of the State for any public purpose.

    State land is owned by the State, administered by the Department of Lands, and leased/licensed under the State Lands Act.

    Myth: land below “three feet or six feet underground” is owned by the State

    Fact: if land is iTaukei land or freehold land, the respective iTaukei owners and registered owners of freehold land have full ownership rights, including to land more than six feet below the ground.

    There are no provisions in law that differentiate between ownership of land above or below six feet from the surface of the land.

    The misconception likely arises from applying mineral ownership to land ownership in Fiji.

    Under the 2013 Constitution and the Mining Act, the State owns all minerals in Fiji – regardless of whether they are found on iTaukei land or freehold land. Minerals include all precious metals and precious stones. Also, under the Petroleum (Exploration and Exploitation) Act 1978, all petroleum is owned by the State.

    What this basically means is that, while ownership of minerals and petroleum is reserved to the State, the owners of iTaukei or freehold lands have full rights to their lands regardless of depth.

    Currently, under the Fair Share of Mineral Royalties Act 2018, landowners receive 80% of mineral royalties, with the State retaining 20%. However, this percentage applies to the royalty that is paid to the State under the Mining Regulations 1966. The rates currently prescribed under the regulations are as follows:

    1. For bauxite or iron ore – at the rate of 3% of their value

    2. For any other mineral – at the rate of 5% of their value.

    This means that landowners will only get 80% of the 5% royalty paid to the State, for example, on the value of gold extracted. TLTB is of the view that royalty currently paid to the respective owners is neither a “fair share” nor does it represent an equitable return of their land.

    TLTB SUBMISSION ON LEGISLATIVE REVIEWS

    The TLTB has made submissions to the Fiji Law Reform Commission on the review of the State Lands Act and Mining Act for:

    1. An amendment to the definition of “State lands” to exclude foreshore, and soil under inland waters, so that full ownership rights are reverted to the respective iTaukei owners

    2. An amendment to the Mining Act for full ownership of minerals to be returned to the respective iTaukei land and qoliqoli owners

    TLTB is also making submissions to the Constitution Review Commission on the review of the 2013 Constitution on the matters above.

    TLTB MANAGEMENT

    Decolonising the Land: A Response to TLTB’s Clarification above:

    The TLTB management deserves a measure of commendation. Earlier today, it issued a public clarification on land ownership and mineral rights—an unusual step for an institution that has historically preferred opacity. The statement correctly dismantles the myth that the State owns land below six feet. It correctly notes that iTaukei and freehold landowners own their land to any depth. And it correctly observes that the so‑called “Fair Share” of mineral royalties is neither fair nor a share: 80 percent of a 5 percent royalty on gold value is; in plain arithmetic, 4 percent of the value. The TLTB even admits this is inadequate.

    That admission is rare. It should not go unremarked.

    But let us not mistake a single candid paragraph for a conversion. The TLTB statement, read in full, reveals an institution that still resides in the past—still pleading with the State for amendments, still accepting the premise that colonial laws are the only framework available, still issuing press releases in English to landowners who speak iTaukei. If TLTB truly intended to “demystify” land ownership, it would have issued the statement ena vosa vakaviti as well. The language of the iTaukei landowner is not legalese. It is not the dialect of Suva boardrooms. It is the voice of the koro, the mataqali, the Vanua. That the TLTB chose English alone tells you whose comfort it prioritises.

    The clarification that clarifies nothing new

    TLTB has told us what the law says. But the law itself is the problem. The iTaukei Lands Act of 1905. The Native Land Trust Act of 1940 (now the iTaukei Land Trust Act). The State Lands Act of 1945. These are colonial statutes, written by British administrators to serve a colonial economy—to make native land available for European plantations, to control the movement of labour, to keep the indigenous population contained and compliant. TLTB is a creature of that era. Its very structure—a board appointed by the minister, a CEO who answers to the board, a welfare fund that deducts money from landowners without their consent—is a colonial trust model, designed to manage natives, not to empower them.

    The TLTB’s statement acknowledges that the current mineral royalty regime is unfair. Then it says: “TLTB has made submissions to the Fiji Law Reform Commission… for amendments.” Submissions. Amendments. This is the language of petitioners, not of trustees. Imagine a freehold landowner discovering gold on their property. Would they write a submission asking the government to please allow them to keep their own minerals? Of course not. They would assert ownership. They would go to court. They would demand. The TLTB, by contrast, asks permission from the very State that wrote the laws, that dispossess iTaukei of their subsoil wealth.

    Decolonisation is not amendment

    TLTB is trapped in a reformist mindset. It believes that tweaking a percentage here, redefining “State lands” there, will eventually deliver justice. That is a delusion. Colonial laws do not become just through amendment; they become just through abolition. The 2013 Constitution itself declares that all minerals belong to the State. That is not a minor clause. That is a fundamental expropriation of iTaukei property. The TLTB’s response is to ask for a review. But the Bose Levu Vakaturaga—the true shareholder of iTaukei land—should not be asking. It should be demanding. It should be preparing legislation that vests full mineral ownership in the landowners; with the State as a licensing partner, not the owner.

    The same applies to foreshores and the soil under inland waters. TLTB says it has asked for an amendment to exclude these from “State lands.” Why ask? Why not assert? Because the TLTB does not see itself as the agent of iTaukei sovereignty. It sees itself as an administrator of a colonial estate. That is the institutional mindset that must die.

    The language of the Vanua

    I return to the language of the statement. The TLTB issued it in English—fluent, legalistic, correct. But the iTaukei landowner, the mataqali member in a remote village, does not read English legal prose. They listen to radio. They hear announcements in the vernacular. If the TLTB genuinely wanted to “demystify” and “clear up misconceptions,” it would have issued the statement in iTaukei on the same day. It would have sent divisional estate officers to explain the difference between land ownership and mineral rights in valevakoros/village halls, not in a press release aimed at Suva journalists.

    The failure to do so is not an oversight. It is a reflex. The TLTB still communicates upward—to the government, to the media—rather than downward to the 400,000 landowners it claims to serve. That is the habit of a colonial trust, not of an indigenous empowerment body.

    What real decolonisation looks like

    Genuine decolonisation of iTaukei land administration requires three acts, none of which the TLTB has proposed:

    First, the repeal of all colonial land statutes—the iTaukei Lands Act, the iTaukei Land Trust Act, the State Lands Act, and the Mining Act—and their replacement with a single, iTaukei‑drafted, constitutionally entrenched Land Sovereignty Act that vests full ownership (including minerals, foreshores, and water columns) in the landowning units, with the State exercising only regulatory powers for safety and environment.

    Second, the transformation of the TLTB itself: not through amendments to its board composition, but through a new institution—call it the Fijian Land Trust Council or whatever the Vanua through the BLV decides—that operates under a hard cap of 10 percent administration, with the President as its Chair, with no sitting minister on the board, and with a statutory obligation to issue all public communications in both English and iTaukei.

    Third, the immediate, unconditional public audit of the $26.1 million welfare fund, with the results published in the vernacular, and every cent of unaccounted money returned to the landowners with interest.

    The TLTB’s statement does not mention any of this. Instead, it asks for amendments. It asks for reviews. It speaks of “submissions.” That is the posture of a supplicant, not a sovereign.

    Conclusion: praise where due, but not silence

    Let me be clear: I commend the TLTB management for acknowledging that the current mineral royalty is not a “fair share.” I commend them for correcting the six‑feet myth. But commendation is not endorsement. A broken clock is right twice a day. The TLTB can issue a correct statement and still be the wrong institution for the job.

    The iTaukei have waited eighty‑five years for TLTB to serve them. It has not. It issues statements in English, asks for amendments, and calls that progress. It is not progress. It is the sound of an old machine trying to sound new.

    The time has come to decolonise not just the laws, but the institution itself. No more pelicans. No more ministers as chair. No more English‑only statements to landowners who speak iTaukei. And no more asking permission for what is already ours.

    The Vanua is watching. The land remembers. And we have waited long enough.

    It is time to wake up.

  • Digital Sovereignty in the Age of AI: Why the Pasifika Must Send Its Best to Both Superpowers

    A quiet scandal sits inside Fiji’s immigration system. Every passport application, every visa, every piece of sensitive biometric data from Fijian citizens is collected through Jotforms—an American‑owned platform run by a Turkish national, hosted on foreign servers beyond our legal reach. Worse, just months ago, the system failed to open because it had “run out of paid or free quota.” A national border function, reduced to a cloud subscription.

    This is not sovereignty. This is digital negligence.

    Yet when someone points out that China’s open‑source AI revolution offers an alternative path—that models like DeepSeek are now neck‑and‑neck with America’s best, and freely available for any nation to download, inspect, and run locally—the response is sometimes dismissive: “Another DeepSeek preacher.”

    That dismissal misses the point entirely. Observing a strategic shift in global technology is not preaching. It is prudence. The real question is not whether to trust China or the United States. It is how a small Pasifika nation navigates between two superpowers without becoming a vassal of either.

    The Jotforms Lesson: Dependency Is Dangerous

    Our current reliance on Jotforms is a perfect example of what happens when no one is paying attention. We handed our citizens’ most sensitive data to a closed‑source, foreign‑controlled platform with no transparency, no local audit, and no fallback when the quota ran out. Where are our local IT geniuses? They are here—graduating from USP, from FNU, from our technical colleges. But they have never been given a strategic mission or the political backing to build national systems from scratch.

    The answer, however, is not to replace American dependency with Chinese dependency. That would be the same mistake, just a different flag. A Chinese cloud platform holding our passport data is no more sovereign than an American one.

    Non‑Alignment in the Age of AI

    For decades, Pasifika nations have practised geopolitical non‑alignment—engaging with Washington, Beijing, Canberra, and Tokyo on our own terms, refusing to be pawns in anyone’s cold war. We need the same doctrine for artificial intelligence.

    China’s open‑source AI models are a powerful tool precisely because they are open. We can download DeepSeek, run it on our own servers, modify it for our languages and needs, and never send a single citizen’s data across an undersea cable. That is fundamentally different from closed‑source American platforms like Jotforms, OpenAI, or Google Cloud, where the code is secret and the data leaves our jurisdiction.

    But the United States still leads in foundational research, chip design, and private investment. American universities like MIT—where young Penioni Narube from Cuvu Village is heading—remain world leaders. To ignore American AI would be as foolish as ignoring Chinese AI.

    A responsible Pasifika government sends its best to both.

    Three Concrete Steps

    1. Audit and reclaim. Conduct an immediate audit of every foreign digital service holding citizen data—Jotforms included. Migrate critical systems to open‑source, locally‑hosted alternatives using code from any nation, but always under our own physical and legal control.
    2. Send our best to both. Establish scholarships and exchange programs with both MIT and Tsinghua University, Stanford and Zhejiang University. Let our brightest software engineers learn AI from every major power, then return to build regional capacity.
    3. Declare digital non‑alignment. Adopt a formal policy that no exclusive cloud or AI agreement will be signed with any single country. Build interoperability, redundancy, and choice into every government system. Small nations survive by keeping options open.

    The Cost of Doing Nothing

    If we continue on our current path, we will wake up in five years to find our government data scattered across half a dozen foreign cloud platforms, our citizens’ faces and fingerprints held in servers we cannot inspect, and our AI future dictated by whichever superpower offers the cheapest subscription.

    That is not sovereignty. That is a quiet surrender.

    The open‑source AI revolution—accelerated by China’s DeepSeek—is not a reason to abandon caution. It is a reason to act. The tools are free. The talent is here. The only missing ingredient is the courage to take a shot, just as a young man from Cuvu did.

    Let us honour his journey by building a Pasifika that no longer needs to send its data abroad. Let us send our best to both superpowers—and then bring them home to build for ourselves.

  • The Tensions We Feel: When Realpolitik Meets the iTaukei Question

    We are living through an age of calculation.

    In one corner of the world, the US President sits across from his Chinese counterpart. For the last thirty-six hours, they were discussing trade, tariffs, and Taiwan. Yet humming beneath every exchange—the elephant that fills the room without ever being named—is West Asia’s bleeding. No one expects morality to interrupt power. No one is surprised.

    In another corner, Australia’s Foreign Minister landed in Fiji, cheque in hand, an energy reprieve as the offering. The message is not subtle: We are still the premier power in the Pasifika. Meanwhile, Fiji’s Prime Minister meets Papua New Guinea’s leadership at the inaugural Melanesian Ocean Summit in Port Moresby. The other elephant—the plight of West Papua, its people gasping under Indonesian watch—fades further into silence. Not because it has been forgotten, but because Indonesia is watching. Realpolitik does not forget; it simply prioritises.

    And then there is Fiji itself.

    The Constitutional Reform Commission now travels to the maritime islands, gathering voices. What emerges from those consultations is not merely a debate about legal clauses or individual rights. It is a raw confrontation between two competing logics: the logic of realpolitik and the logic of what we might call idealpolitik.

    The urban elite—educated, connected, comfortable—argue for individual rights as the centrepiece of any new constitution. They speak the language of Western liberal democracy: equality before the law, the erasure of ethnic distinctions, the triumph of the citizen over the communal self. They point to the 2013 Constitution, which made “Fijian” a term for all citizens, and they call it progress.

    But among the majority iTaukei—especially those outside the urban centres—this is not progress. It is erasure.

    For the iTaukei, the term “Fijian” was, is, and will always belong to the first people of this land. The 2013 Constitution did not unify; it dispossessed—of land and of identity. The Bose Levu Vakaturaga (BLV) was removed, not reformed. A cultural and political architecture that had stood for generations, was simply erased. In its place came a single, flattening word: Fijian for everyone.

    The iTaukei response, framed in the language of realpolitik, is brutally simple: Power asymmetry must be addressed first.

    Why? Because the numbers tell a story our urban elite would rather not read. The iTaukei make up 75 percent of Fiji’s poverty population. Village housing—the foundation of iTaukei communal life—has been left to rot by successive governments, tourist-board images of smiling, happy villagers, notwithstanding. Native lands are leased out under Unimproved Capital Value (UCV) arrangements that ensure landowners receive a pittance in lease payments, while tenants build mansions on these same UCV’d lands. Freehold landowners, meanwhile, face no such shackles; only iTaukei landowners who lease their lands are bound this way. Add to this the cascading crises of drugs, HIV, and non-communicable diseases—all disproportionately affecting iTaukei communities—and the picture becomes impossible to ignore.

    The idealpolitik response is to say: These are class issues, not ethnic ones. A bill of individual rights will lift everyone.

    But the iTaukei no longer believe this. Their scepticism is not irrational. It is the hard-won wisdom of people who have been “used and abused”—who have seen their identity reduced to a tourism slogan, their institutions dismantled in the name of unity, their material conditions ignored while others prospered.

    In realpolitik terms, the iTaukei are now playing the only game that makes sense: they are naming their national interest. And they are saying, bluntly, that Fiji cannot become one nation until the foundational asymmetry between its indigenous people and everyone else is resolved. Not papered over. Not celebrated in cultural performances. Resolved.

    The urban elite call this divisive. The iTaukei call it honest.

    Consider the parallel with geopolitics. The United States does not raise West Papua with Indonesia because the relationship matters more than the principle. Australia does not mention it because its strategic calculus in the Pasifika runs through Jakarta. And Fiji and PNG, sitting together in Port Moresby, say nothing because to speak is to risk.

    That is realpolitik: what works, not what is right.

    The iTaukei are now asking whether Fiji’s urban elite are any different. Are they not, too, practising a form of realpolitik—one that preserves a constitution they benefit from, that protects individual rights precisely because those rights do not threaten their own power? Calling it “idealism” does not make it so. Idealism that refuses to see material suffering, is merely privilege dressed up as principle.

    The question facing Fiji is not whether to choose between power and principle. The question is: whose power, and whose principle?

    For the iTaukei, the way forward is clear. Restore the BLV to its rightful place. Recognise that “Fijian” belongs to the first people. Address land leases so that native owners are not perpetual tenants in their own domain, receiving only a pittance. And do all of this not as a gift, but as a precondition for any genuine national stability.

    Without this, the idealpolitik of individual rights will ring hollow. A constitution that makes everyone legally equal while iTaukei villages decay, iTaukei bodies suffer from preventable disease, and iTaukei children grow up in poverty—that is not unity. That is a formula for slow-burning resentment.

    The world watches as superpowers choose pragmatism over justice in West Papua. Fiji has the chance to choose differently—not by abandoning pragmatism, but by recognising that true pragmatism begins at home, with the people who have been waiting the longest.

    The tensions we feel are not abstract. They are the tensions between those who have been heard and those who have not; between those who benefit from the way things are and those who can no longer afford to wait.

    Who are we? We are a nation standing at the edge of a choice: continue the realpolitik of silence, or embrace a different kind of realism—one that understands that a nation which ignores the cry of its first people will never, in the end, be stable.

    The elephant in Fiji’s room has a name. It is time to speak it.

  • Beyond the Fear of the Word: Why Indo-Fijians Need to Understand iTaukei Communalism

    In Fiji, the word “communalism” has become a ghost at the feast. It is invoked with a shudder—usually by urban, educated, multiracial progressives, who see it as the opposite of national unity. For many Indo-Fijians, communalism evokes the coups of 1987, the 1990 constitution’s guaranteed parliamentary majority for indigenous Fijians, and the lingering suspicion that in any crisis, blood will speak louder than citizenship.

    But here is a difficult truth: communalism is not going away. And more importantly, for the iTaukei, it is not merely a political preference. It is a philosophy of survival, identity, and dignity. To demand that iTaukei abandon their communal framework is, in effect, to demand that they cease being iTaukei. That is neither realistic nor just.

    The question, then, is not whether communalism should exist. The question is whether Indo-Fijians can learn to read it correctly—not as a threat, but as a different grammar of belonging. And whether, in that reading, a new kind of national conversation becomes possible.

    A Lesson from Philadelphia: Anger Is Not the Enemy of Understanding

    In March 2008, at the height of a presidential campaign that had already broken racial barriers, Barack Obama stood before a nation deeply divided over the inflammatory sermons of his former pastor, Reverend Jeremiah Wright. Obama could have condemned Wright and moved on. Instead, he did something rare. He acknowledged the roots of Wright’s anger—the generations of racism, segregation, and neglect that had shaped black churches. Then he also acknowledged the resentment of working-class white Americans who felt they had watched their jobs and communities disappear.

    He said: “The anger is real; it is powerful; and to simply wish it away, to condemn it without understanding its roots, only serves to widen the chasm of misunderstanding that exists between the races.”

    Fiji can learn from this. Indo-Fijian anger about coups and the fear of being permanent outsiders—that anger is real. iTaukei anger about land alienation, cultural erosion, and the feeling of being strangers in their own ancestral home—that anger is also real. Neither can be wished away by a constitution or a national slogan. The first step toward a more perfect union is not to suppress communal anger, but to listen to what it is actually protecting.

    What Communalism Actually Means in iTaukei Life

    Let us strip away the political caricature. For an iTaukei villager in Ra or Cakaudrove, communalism is not a doctrine imposed by a nationalist politician. It is the daily reality of veilomani (mutual care), solesolevaki (shared labor), and veivuke (assistance). It is the mataqali (land-owning unit) holding together families who have tilled the same soil for generations. It is the yavusa deciding together whether to lease grazing land to a sugar farmer or to reforest a watershed.

    When iTaukei speak anxiously about “land” or “custom” or taukei (owners of the land), they are not speaking about property deeds in the Western sense. They are speaking about Vanua—a word that means land, but also people, also custom, also the spiritual presence of ancestors. To be iTaukei is to be in relationship with the Vanua. That relationship is inherently communal. No iTaukei stands alone before the state. They stand within a web of obligations and inheritances.

    What iTaukei communalism seeks is recognition—that their ancestral way of organizing society has a legitimate place alongside the individualist, contract-based, market-driven logic that arrived with colonialism and sugar, and is now embedded in the imposed 2013 constitution.

    Why Indo-Fijians Often Misread Communalism as Exclusion

    The misunderstanding is understandable. Indo-Fijian history in this country is a story of individual and family survival. Arriving as girmitiyas between 1879 and 1920, Indo-Fijians had their communal bonds systematically broken by the colonial plantation system. They rebuilt them—through panchayats, through mandalis, through temples and sangams—but those bonds were always voluntary associations, not ancestral birthrights.

    Indo-Fijians feel they do not belong but have overhwelming economic power. Are they willing to share these in a genuine manner that embraces being Fijian, in the iTaukei sense? iTaukei have seen their land and culture stripped away. Neither grievance cancels the other. As Obama put it: “We can condemn a statement without condemning the person. We can acknowledge the pain of a community without endorsing every word spoken in that pain.” Indo-Fijians can reject ethno-nationalist politics while still understanding the pain behind iTaukei communalism. iTaukei can reject the bitterness of some Indo-Fijian leaders while still understanding the trauma of girmit and its aftermath.

    What Thoughtful Understanding Looks Like

    To “understand” iTaukei communalism does not mean agreeing with every iTaukei political demand. It does not mean accepting racial discrimination or supporting the abolition of the common roll. It means three things.

    First, understanding that iTaukei communalism is primarily defensive, not aggressive. The fear that drives most iTaukei anxiety is that globalization, land sales, tourism development and climate displacement will erode the Vanua until nothing is left. When an iTaukei elder insists on communal land tenure, they are trying to prevent a future where their grandchildren sell the last piece of ancestral soil for a resort and a second-hand SUV. Indo-Fijians, who have no ancestral land base of their own, can afford to see land as a commodity. iTaukei cannot.

    Second, understanding that communalism and multiracial democracy are not mutually exclusive—but they do require new institutions. Switzerland manages three languages and two religions through a federal system that gives cantons significant cultural autonomy. Belgium has been held together for decades by sophisticated power-sharing arrangements. Fiji has never seriously attempted a consociational model—one that guarantees iTaukei communal representation alongside common-roll seats, with iTaukei vetoes on matters of culture and land. Instead, we have swung between iTaukei-dominated ethnocracy (1987–2006) and a “one man, one vote” system (2013 onward) that many iTaukei see as imposed without addressing their existential anxiety. A thoughtful Indo-Fijian might ask: Is there a middle way that protects my vote and their Vanua?

    Third, understanding that iTaukei communalism contains wisdom that Indo-Fijians might actually need. The global climate crisis is going to devastate Fiji’s coastal villages and sugar belts. Individualist responses—buying your own higher ground, insuring your own assets—will fail. Survival will require veivuke: collective decisions about relocation, resource sharing, and mutual obligation. iTaukei have been doing this for centuries. Their communal structures, adapted wisely, could become Fiji’s resilience architecture. Indo-Fijians who dismiss communalism as backward are walking away from a toolkit that might save their grandchildren.

    The Path Forward: From Fear to a More Perfect Union

    Obama concluded his Philadelphia speech with a simple, powerful image: “I have never been so naive as to believe that we can get beyond our racial divisions in a single election cycle. But I do believe that we can get beyond them if we work together.” He did not demand that anyone leave their identity at the door. He asked only that each side extend the same grace to the other that they would claim for themselves.

    No one is asking Indo-Fijians to stop being Indo-Fijian. No one is asking iTaukei to stop being iTaukei. What thoughtful understanding asks is this: Stop seeing each other’s communalism as a zero-sum threat.

    When an iTaukei speaks of the Vanua, an Indo-Fijian could learn to hear “home” rather than “hierarchy.” When an Indo-Fijian speaks of individual enterprise, an iTaukei could learn to hear “aspiration” rather than “greed.” These translations are not easy. They require humility, patience, and the courage to sit in discomfort.

    But the alternative is what Fiji has known for too long: a politics of mutual suspicion where each community waits for the other to weaken. That is not a nation. That is a ceasefire.

    The Bose Levu Vakaturaga could be one space for this translation. A reformed parliamentary system, with genuine protections for both communal and individual rights, could be another. But no institution will work if the heart is not willing—if we refuse to see that, as Obama put it, “we may have come on different ships, but we are all in the same boat now.”

    Indo-Fijians do not need to embrace communalism. They need to understand it—as a living, breathing, wounded, hopeful expression of iTaukei humanity. And in that understanding, perhaps, discover that their own survival is not separate from the survival of the Vanua. It is the same ocean, same shore, same storm.

    The difficulties will pass. But only if we stop rowing against each other, and start rowing toward the same horizon.

  • Our Thoughtlessness as Fijians: The Real Litter We Leave Behind

    Two weeks ago, I posted a video. It showed what anyone driving past the Naboro Prison junction can see with their own eyes: plastic bottles wedged into highway drains, food wrappers tangled in grass, rubbish breeding in full view of prisoners, Corrections personnel, commuters, and families.

    I have been watching to see if it would trigger a positive reaction. This morning, I drove that same road again. Alas, nothing had changed. The garbage continues to pile up. And there, walking along the shoulder, were prisoners under the watch of a Corrections officer. Across the drain—overflowing with garbage—people waited at the bus stop. No one looked at the drain. No one seemed to notice. Or if they did, they had already perfected the Fijian art of looking away.

    We are good at that. Very good.

    The law with teeth, and our habit of silence

    Fiji’s new parental liability law for littering is bold. It says parents can be fined or given community service when their children discard rubbish. On paper, it has teeth. But a law only bites when someone points at what needs chewing. And that is where we fail as neighbours.

    We see a prisoner walking past filth. We see a bus stop beside a reeking drain. We watch a Corrections officer lead a chain of able-bodied men past a mess they could clean in an hour, max. We are not cruel people. We are not lazy in our own homes. But in public spaces, we have developed a peculiar, quiet thoughtlessness—a habit of assuming that someone else will care.

    Who is the “someone else”?

    At Naboro, the “someone else” is conveniently everyone. The Fiji Corrections Service has prisoners who need purpose and rehabilitation. Cleaning their own roadside would teach more than any anger management class. The residents who wait at that bus stop—can they not see the potential health hazard to their families? And Corrections officers—can they not see the same hazard for those in their custody?

    But we don’t act. Because thoughtlessness often masks itself as politeness. So we breathe the hazard instead.

    The law alone will not save us

    The Minister for Environment said we are all custodians. But custodianship is not a government portfolio. It is the small, undramatic act of bending down and doing what is right there on your doorstep—for all and sundry to see.

    Education, fines, and even shame have their place. But before any of that works, we must admit our own role in the silence. Every time we see rubbish and do nothing, we teach the child beside us that litter is tolerable.

    A movement, not a mandate

    The parental litter law is not flawed. It is unfinished. It gives us a tool, but we are the hand that must wield it. That means asking the Corrections Service, publicly and politely, why their able workforce is not being deployed to their own junction. That means bus stop commuters refusing to wait in silence beside a health hazard.

    Fiji’s beauty is not automatic. It is an act of daily will. And right now, at the Naboro Prison junction, our will is on holiday. Let us call it home—not with shame, but with the quiet, firm thoughtfulness we have misplaced for too long.

    The rubbish will not disappear by magic. It will disappear when we stop pretending it is someone else’s problem.

  • Why Time, Not Troops, Will Decide Taiwan’s Future

    The prevailing Western consensus on Taiwan is built on a single, seductive metaphor: a window. China, the argument goes, is watching for a narrow opening—US weakness, regional crisis, military readiness—through which it will launch a devastating invasion. The Economist gestures at this with its report on American troop movements near the strait, framing the calm spring weather as a danger sign. The implied logic: a rising power, seeing vulnerability, strikes.

    This framing is wrong. Not because China lacks the capability or the desire for reunification, but because it fundamentally misunderstands Beijing’s theory of victory.

    China is not playing for territory. It is playing for time.

    The Temporal Victory Condition

    For most great powers, victory means control: of land, of resources, of strategic chokepoints. For China regarding Taiwan, victory means making the very question of control obsolete. The long game has never been about a climactic amphibious assault. It has been about demographic integration, economic enmeshment, and the slow, patient erosion of any functional separation between the island and the mainland.

    Consider the mechanics: over one million Taiwanese live and work in mainland China. Cross-strait trade has, until recent tensions, dwarfed Taiwan’s trade with the US. Chinese investment, supply chains, and talent flows have bound Taiwanese prosperity to the mainland’s economic orbit. This is not coercion in any traditional military sense. It is gravity.

    Every year that passes without war, China’s relative economic weight grows, Taiwan’s birth rate declines, and the generation that remembers a separate “anti-communist” Taiwan fades. The status quo—US formal non-recognition paired with de facto deterrence—is already a frozen conflict. And frozen conflicts, when one side has demography and economics on its side, thaw in only one direction.

    Why Kagan’s Mirror Misses the Mark

    The strategic thinker Robert Kagan is correct about Iran: a mid-tier power can exhaust a superpower through asymmetric attrition, depleting munitions and alliance credibility. But his extrapolation to China assumes Beijing shares Tehran’s window-of-opportunity logic. It does not -https://archive.is/zDr0t#selection-623.0-623.12.

    China has watched the US stumble through Iraq, Afghanistan, the Red Sea and now the Persian Gulf. It has observed that America’s greatest vulnerability is not its aircraft carriers but its attention span. And yet, Beijing has not lunged. Why? Because a war—even a winning war—would reset the clock. It would galvanize a unified Western alliance, accelerate tech decoupling, trigger sanctions that harm precisely the advanced sectors China needs, and transform a quiet demographic victory into a century of armed resistance.

    China’s restraint is not weakness. It is a sign that its definition of winning differs entirely from Washington’s or the west’s.

    The Self-Inflicted Wound

    Here is the irony that Kagan and his fellow realists miss: the US is already doing China’s most important work for it. A foreign policy that abandons allies (Kurds, Afghans), mocks treaty commitments (NATO), and imposes capricious tariffs does not project strength. It broadcasts unreliability. And when allies hedge—diversifying supply chains, building independent defense industrial bases, reducing dollar exposure—they are not betraying the US. They are responding rationally to perceived American decline.

    That hedging is China’s real prize. It does not need to break the US-led order. It only needs to wait while the US breaks its own credibility.

    The Natural Horizon

    Taiwan will not be invaded. It will, over a generational timescale, become integrated. Not through a dramatic flag-raising in Taipei, but through the mundane reality that young Taiwanese increasingly see their future in Shanghai and Shenzhen, that Taiwanese companies cannot afford to lose mainland market access, and that the legal architecture of “one China” slowly fills with administrative substance.

    This is not defeatism. It is a description of gravitational politics.

    The question for Washington is not how to prevent this outcome—that ship sailed with the failure to decouple Taiwanese prosperity from Chinese markets decades ago. The question is whether the US will exhaust itself in a panic, launching a self-destructive spiral of overcommitment and allied alienation, or whether it will accept that its role in East Asia is to manage decline, not reverse it.

    The real danger is not China striking while the US is weak. It is the US, terrified of that possibility, doing something monumentally foolish—like a formal defense commitment that invites brinksmanship, or a strategic decoupling that forces the very confrontation it fears.

    China is playing chess. The US is still arguing about whether the board is tilted.

    The quiet truth is this: some victories do not require a single shot fired. They only require that the other side believes time is on its side. And on Taiwan, time is not neutral.

  • The Long Journey and the Curved Arc of Righteousness: Itaukei Aspirations Through the Bose Levu Vakaturaga

    “The journey is long, the arc of righteousness with curve.”

    This simple yet profound saying captures a truth deeply understood by the itaukei. The path of a people is never a straight line; it bends, it weaves, it sometimes retreats before advancing. From the vantage of the Bose Levu Vakaturaga (BLV); whose modern incarnation carries a very different burden than its predecessor, this curved arc of righteousness offers a powerful lens through which to understand indigenous aspirations, especially when those aspirations may not be fulfilled in our own lifetime.

    Two Councils, Two Eras: From Open Politics to Intergenerational Custody

    To speak of the BLV today is to acknowledge a profound transformation. The old BLV, openly supported political parties, endorsed candidates, and was deeply entangled in Fiji’s volatile politics. It was not merely a customary body; it was a political actor, wielding considerable influence. That era brought some victories for itaukei interests, but it also brought division, controversy, and a gradual erosion of the BLV’s moral authority in the eyes of many.

    The BLV of today, reinstated in 2023 after years of abolition, has learned from that curved arc. Its mandate is no longer to back prime ministers or sway elections. Instead, its work is quieter, deeper, and far longer in its horizon: to ensure intergenerational prosperity for the itaukei—prosperity that may not be seen or measured within the lifetime of any chief sitting in Council today.

    This shift from open politics to intergenerational stewardship is not a retreat from power; it is a redefinition of it. The old BLV sought victories in election cycles. The new BLV plants trees under whose shade it knows it will never sit.

    The Long Journey: Memory, Loss, and a Patience Beyond Politics

    For the itaukei, the journey began long before colonial maps or constitutional crises. It began with the first canoes, the settlement of our islands and the establishment of the mataqali bound by love and mutual care. That journey has included moments of great mana—the Deed of Cession, the protection of itaukei land. But it has also included painful curves: the erosion of chiefly protocols, the temporary abolition of the BLV itself and the quiet struggle to maintain identity in a globalising world.

    The old BLV responded to these curves by entering the political arena directly—backing parties, making endorsements, seeking immediate influence. But that approach, however well-intentioned, proved curved in its own way: it brought short-term gains but long-term instability, including the Council’s own abolition in 2012.

    The new BLV, drawing from that hard lesson, now understands a deeper truth: intergenerational prosperity cannot be secured by election cycles. A land-use policy that benefits a single generation may impoverish the next. A constitutional clause that favours one political alliance may be repealed by another. True prosperity for the Vanua (land, people, custom) requires decisions whose fruits will be harvested by grandchildren and great-grandchildren—people not yet born, whose faces the chiefs will never see.

    The Arc of Righteousness with Curve: Why We May Not See Its Bending

    The quote speaks of “righteousness”—not justice alone, but something deeper. In the itaukei worldview, righteousness is correctness woven into veilomani (compassion), veidokai (respect), and veiyaloni (reconciliation). A righteous society is one where the Vanua is in balance: where qoliqoli are shared, where kerekere (customary requesting) functions without exploitation, where the yavusa cares for its vulnerable.

    But why “with curve”? Because the path to righteousness is rarely direct. And crucially, from the perspective of the new BLV, the most important curves may bend so slowly that no living person will see them straighten.

    Consider three examples of work the current Council is undertaking—work whose results belong to another era:

    1. Climate resilience for coastal villages: The BLV today advocates for the managed relocation of itaukei communities threatened by rising seas. The policies, funding agreements, and customary protocols being negotiated now may take thirty years to fully implement. The chiefs who sign those agreements will likely be dead before the last family moves safely to higher ground. That is intergenerational work.

    2. Protection of iTaukei intellectual property: The Council is quietly supporting legal frameworks to protect masi (tapa) designs, traditional navigation knowledge, and medicinal plant lore from commercial exploitation. These protections may not bear fruit—may not stop a single overseas counterfeit—for a decade or more. The chiefs sitting today may never read a court ruling in their favour. Yet they work.

    3. Revitalisation of endangered dialects: Nearly a dozen iTaukei dialects are losing fluent speakers. The BLV’s current efforts to document them, integrate them into school curricula, and support elder-to-youth transmission will not restore those dialects in five years—or even in twenty. The arc bends so slowly that only the grandchildren of today’s youth may once again speak their village’s original tongue freely. But the bending begins now.

    Aspirations That Transcend a Single Lifetime

    What do itaukei people aspire to? From the new BLV’s perspective, the answer cannot be “power in the next election.” It must be:

    · Sovereignty of custom: That vakaturaga be respected as a living legal and ethical system, not as a political pawn.

    · Land as identity: That meaningful decision-making over iTaukei lands, forests, and waters returns to the mataqali and yavusa—even if that return takes half a century of legal and constitutional advocacy.

    · Cultural continuity: That every itaukei child, a hundred years from now, knows their yavusa, their mataqali, and their vasu (maternal ties)—even if no living chief today will see that fully realised classroom.

    · Unity without political division: That the itaukei people find common cause across provinces and clans, not through a political party endorsed by chiefs, but through shared commitment to a seven-generation horizon.

    Why We Will Not See It—And Why That Is the Point

    The old BLV sought results it could see: an election won, a minister appointed, a budget allocated. Those results were real, but they were also fleeting. Governments fall. Alliances shift. What one Parliament grants, another can revoke.

    The new BLV has accepted a harder truth: the most important work is the work we will never witness. A replanted mangrove forest that protects a village from cyclones in 2070—planted by chiefs who will be bones in the ground by then. A land trust structure that prevents alienation for centuries—designed by men and women who will never collect its dividends. A generation of itaukei lawyers and elders who can recite customary law as fluently as statute—educated under programmes initiated by a Council that will not be there to see them graduate.

    This is the “curve” in its deepest sense. The arc of righteousness bends away from immediate gratification, away from political headlines, away from the ego of “I did this.” It bends instead toward a future that the present generation will only glimpse. And that is precisely what makes it righteous.

    Conclusion

    For the itaukei, the Bose Levu Vakaturaga is no longer a political machine. It is a covenant across time—a body that has learned from its own history of open politics and chosen instead the harder, quieter path of intergenerational prosperity. The journey is long. The arc curves. And we, the living, will not see its completion.

    But that does not mean it does not bend.

    From the chiefly house before the yaqona (kava), the elders nod not for themselves, but for the ones who will come after. Our possessions will pass away—as long as the people of the land thrive.

  • The Fog of War and the Vacuum of Aims: Two Months of Confusion in the Gulf

    What began on February 28th as a thunderclap of coordinated American-Israeli strikes against Iran, has now dragged into a third month of bloodshed, reprisals, and regional chaos. Yet, more than two months later, a durable peace is nowhere on the horizon—and perhaps the most frightening reason is that Washington still cannot articulate why it is fighting.

    Back on that February night, the United States and Israel launched their war without informing their Western allies, let alone the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, who sit just across the water and have taken the full brunt of the war up close—from missile debris to disrupted shipping lanes to the economic strangulation of the Hormuz Strait. Now, 66 days into a conflict with no endgame, the prevailing whisper in Washington is that the Gulf should be grateful.

    Grateful for what? For being blindsided? For being turned into a frontline buffer zone?

    This is not strategy. It is arrogance wrapped in amateur hour—and the passage of time has only laid bare the rot underneath.

    Two months in, the most dangerous weapon in this war is not an Iranian drone or an Israeli bunker buster. It is the profound, paralyzing confusion over America’s ultimate aim. Is this a war to dismantle Iran’s nuclear program? A campaign to cripple the IRGC? A perpetual open-ended commitment to defend Israel, leaving America’s oldest Arab allies to absorb the shrapnel? Or—as daily headlines of stalled back-channel talks suggest—is it merely a tantrum masquerading as policy?

    The Gulf states have spent nine weeks asking a question that the White House cannot answer: What does victory look like? Without a coherent objective, this is not leadership; it is a bar fight where the instigator cannot remember why he threw the first punch. And when the brawl grinds on for two months with no exit strategy, the instigator’s confusion becomes indistinguishable from sheer incompetence.

    That incompetence now hides in plain sight at the highest levels of the administration. The Secretary of State, who is also the National Security Advisor, has effectively abdicated diplomacy to two real estate developers. Let that sink in: the world’s sole superpower has handed the intricate, bloody, and delicate file of containing Iran to men whose career highlights involve steel, glass, and closing deals.

    Diplomacy for a durable peace is not a real estate transaction. It does not reward impatience. It requires the gravitas to sit in a room for months, to achieve a tenuous ceasefire. And the wisdom to know that after two months of war without peace, the real estate approach has failed. The developers lack the patience for deterrence and the nuance for escalation management. They see “deals” where there are only dilemmas. And now, with the war grinding into its third month and no cease-fire in sight, their handiwork has produced the worst of all worlds: a conflict with no purpose, no timeline, and no off-ramp.

    The result is a policy of maximum pressure with minimum thought, leaving the UAE’s ports, Saudi Arabia’s oil fields, and Bahrain’s coastline as perpetual collateral damage in a war whose purpose shifts by the hour—or, increasingly, seems to have no purpose at all.

    The greatest casualty of this administration’s incompetence is trust. By sidelining the Gulf on February 28th, and by offering no coherent vision in the two months since, Washington has proved that its Arab partners are not allies. They are insurance policies—to be billed after the accident, but never consulted before it.

    For the GCC, the lesson is brutal. They have taken the full brunt of a war launched by others. They have endured two months of economic turbulence, missile warnings, and diplomatic whiplash. And in return, they are lectured about gratitude.

    If this is the new American way after 66 days of aimless conflict, the Gulf will not rush to spend its treasure defending a superpower that cannot explain why it is fighting—or, more damningly, whether it even remembers. The fog of war is one thing. A vacuum of aims is quite another. And that vacuum, far more than any Iranian missile, is the real threat to a durable peace.

  • Toxic by Default: Why Fiji Must Wake Up to our Social Media Crisis

    Acting DPP Nancy Tikoisuva delivered a sobering reality check this week: social media posts do not move the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions. “We only respond to evidence – admissible evidence,” she said. Hearsay and online chatter do not count in a court of law.

    But beneath that legal clarity lies a deeper crisis. If social media is not a court, what is it becoming? For Fiji, the answer is alarming. Against a backdrop of escalating drugs, HIV and NCD crises, our online spaces have devolved into an “outlaw country”—a toxic swamp of hate, scams, and anonymous trolling. As one observer put it, “every person for himself and herself.” The question for the National Security Council (NSC): Should the digital realm be policed for our national sanity? The answer is my view is, yes.

    The unseen threat to national cohesion

    Prime Minister Rabuka rightly stated that national security now includes digital systems and psychological well‑being. Social media toxicity is not a nuisance—it is a security threat. Hate speech, doxxing and coordinated harassment erode our social fabric, traumatise individuals and substitute mob rule for the rule of law. The damage to our collective Pasifika psyche is as real as any drug bust.

    Consider the real‑world consequences. Young Fijians are self‑harming after online pile‑ons. Families are torn apart by viral lies. Witnesses to serious crimes refuse to come forward because they fear being named and shamed on Facebook before they ever reach a police station. The DPP’s office cannot act on a screenshot—but the damage is already done. This is not a moral panic; it is a public health and security emergency dressed in digital clothing.

    The Singapore solution: a blueprint for the Pasifika

    Australia and Indonesia have banned under‑16s from social media. But Fiji should study Singapore’s more comprehensive model. Singapore’s Protection from Harassment Act (POHA) criminalises online harassment, stalking and doxxing, with extraterritorial reach and penalties up to 12 months’ jail. Its Online Criminal Harms Act (OCHA) lets authorities swiftly disable criminal content.

    Most relevant is Singapore’s new Online Safety (Relief and Accountability) Bill (OSRA) , launched this year. It creates an Online Safety Commission with real teeth: binding takedown orders, account restrictions, and the power to unmask anonymous abusers. Victims of deepfakes, doxxing and sexual harassment get a one‑stop agency. Platforms that refuse to comply face criminal sanctions. And statutory torts let victims sue abusers, group admins and platforms directly. Singapore removes anonymity as a shield and places legal duties on those who run online spaces.

    Why does this matter for Fiji? Because our current Online Safety Commission has publicly admitted it lacks the legal authority to remove harmful content or compel platforms to act. A victim can report a death threat, but the Commission’s hands are tied. Singapore showed that strong laws do not kill free speech—they kill impunity. In the three years since POHA was strengthened, Singapore saw no decline in legitimate expression, but a measurable drop in organised online harassment campaigns.

    A mandate for the National Security Council?

    Fiji is not starting from scratch. A taskforce aims to bar under‑16s by year’s end, and Minister Tabuya admits the current Online Safety Act lacks “teeth.” But a ban on children does nothing for today’s toxic adult spaces. The NSC must urgently study the Singapore model and recommend a multi‑layered approach:

    1. Empower the Online Safety Commission – binding takedown notices, fines for non‑compliant platforms, and investigative powers without waiting for police.

    2. Criminalise anonymity for abusers – compel platforms to reveal perpetrators’ identities upon reasonable suspicion of criminal harassment.

    3. Duty of care legislation – hold group and platform administrators legally liable if they knowingly allow hate speech to thrive.

    Concluding

    The DPP’s warning is stark: the court of public opinion is lawless. When we allow social media to become a toxic dumping ground without consequence, we undermine the police, the courts and the rule of law. Protecting the national psyche is now as vital as protecting our borders. Without urgent, enforceable laws along Singapore’s lines, Fiji’s digital future will remain a lawless frontier—damaging our collective soul one hateful post at a time. The National Security Council meets to address threats. It is time they recognised that the most pervasive threat today is not at the border. It is in the palm of every Fijian’s hand.

  • iTaukei Communalism: Beyond the fear of the word

    In Fiji, “communalism” haunts our public square like a ghost at the feast. Urban, multiracial progressives invoke it with a shudder. For many Indo-Fijians, it still smells of the 1987 coups, the 1990 constitution, and the fear that in a crisis, blood will outrank citizenship.

    But here is a hard truth: communalism in Fiji is not fading. For the iTaukei, it is not a political slogan. It is a philosophy of survival, identity and dignity. To demand that we abandon our communal framework is to ask us to cease being iTaukei. That is neither realistic nor just.

    So the real question is not whether communalism should exist. It is whether Indo-Fijians can learn to read it correctly—not as a threat, but as a different grammar of belonging.

    Anger is not the enemy

    In March 2008, during a firestorm over his pastor’s sermons, Barack Obama did something rare. He did not simply condemn the anger. He traced its roots: generations of racism and neglect, but also the resentment of working-class whites watching their jobs disappear.

    “The anger is real,” Obama said. “To simply wish it away, to condemn it without understanding its roots, only widens the chasm of misunderstanding.”

    Fiji can learn here. Indo-Fijian anger over coups and being treated as permanent outsiders—that is real. iTaukei anger over land alienation, cultural erosion and feeling like strangers in our own home—that is also real. No constitution or national slogan can wish either away.

    What communalism actually is

    Forget the caricature of a nationalist plot. For an iTaukei villager in Ba or Cakaudrove, communalism is the daily reality of veilomani (mutual care), solesolevaki (shared labour) and veivuke (assistance). It is the mataqali holding together families who have tilled the same soil for generations. It is the yavusa deciding together whether to lease land to a sugar farmer or reforest a watershed.

    When iTaukei speak of land or taukei, they are not talking about Western property deeds. They mean Vanua—land, people, custom, ancestors. To be iTaukei is to stand within a web of obligation, never alone before the state.

    What iTaukei communalism seeks is recognition: that our ancestral way of life deserves a place alongside the individualist, market logic that arrived with colonialism and sugar, and is now embedded in our imposed 2013 constitution.

    Why Indo-Fijians misread it

    That misunderstanding is understandable. Indo-Fijians came as girmitiyas (1879–1920), their communal bonds deliberately broken by the plantation system. They rebuilt—through panchayats, temples, sangams—but those bonds were voluntary, not ancestral birthrights.

    Today, Indo-Fijians feel they do not fully belong, yet hold overwhelming economic power. The honest question is: are they willing to share that power in a way that embraces being Fijian in the deeper iTaukei sense? Meanwhile, iTaukei have seen their land and culture stripped away.

    Neither grievance cancels the other. As Obama said: “We can condemn a statement without condemning the person. We can acknowledge the pain of a community without endorsing every word spoken in that pain.”

    Three things thoughtful understanding means

    Understanding iTaukei communalism does not mean accepting racial discrimination or scrapping the common roll. It means three things.

    First, it is defensive, not aggressive. The driving fear is that globalisation, land sales, tourism and climate displacement will erase the Vanua. When an iTaukei elder defends communal land, he is not plotting to expel tenants. He is trying to stop his grandchildren from selling ancestral soil for a resort and a second-hand SUV. Indo-Fijians, with no ancestral land base, can afford to see land as a commodity. iTaukei cannot.

    Second, communalism and multiracial democracy can co-exist—with new institutions. Fiji has never genuinely tried a power-sharing model: iTaukei communal representation alongside common-roll seats, with iTaukei vetoes on culture and land. Instead, we swung from iTaukei-dominated ethnocracy (1987–2006) to a “one man, one vote” system (2013 onward) that many iTaukei see as imposed without addressing our existential anxiety. A thoughtful Indo-Fijian might ask: Is there a middle way that protects my vote and their Vanua?

    Third, iTaukei communalism holds wisdom Indo-Fijians may need. The climate crisis will devastate our coasts and sugar belts. Individualist solutions—buying higher ground, insuring alone—will fail. Survival requires veivuke: collective decisions on relocation, resource sharing, mutual obligation. iTaukei have done this for centuries. Our communal structures could become Fiji’s resilience architecture. Dismiss them as backward, and you walk away from a toolkit that might save your grandchildren.

    The path forward

    Obama ended his Philadelphia speech with this: “I have never been so naive as to believe that we can get beyond our racial divisions in a single election cycle. But I do believe that we can get beyond them if we work together.” The Bose Levu Vakaturaga (BLV) believes it is possible. In intergenerational terms.

    No one is asking Indo-Fijians to stop being Indo-Fijian. No one is asking iTaukei to stop being iTaukei. We are asked only to stop seeing each other’s communalism as a zero-sum threat.

    When an iTaukei speaks of Vanua, hear “home”, not “hierarchy”. When an Indo-Fijian speaks of enterprise, hear “aspiration”, not “greed”. These translations are hard. They require humility and discomfort.

    But the alternative is what Fiji has known too long: a politics of mutual suspicion, each community waiting for the other to weaken. That is not a nation. That is a ceasefire.

    The BLV could be one space for translation. A reformed parliament with genuine communal and individual protections could be another. But no institution works if the heart is unwilling—if we refuse to see, as Obama put it, that “we may have come on different ships, but we are all in the same boat now.”

    Indo-Fijians do not need to embrace communalism. They need to understand it—as a living, wounded, hopeful expression of iTaukei humanity. In that understanding, perhaps discover that their own survival is not separate from the survival of the Vanua.

    Same ocean. Same shore. Same storm. Same boat

    The difficulties will pass. But only if we stop rowing against each other, and start rowing toward the same horizon.